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Summary
The article presents situation on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in banking sector
during last twenty years. The main motives are selected and analyzed. All is explained on
the base on research reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank and the European Central Bank.
Introduction 
The recent flurry of big mergers is attracting much attention, partly because of
heightened interest in what motivates firms to merge and how mergers affect competition
and the economy. 
A large process of financial consolidation has taken place in the European Union in
the last years, although cross-border mergers and acquisitions activity remains limited in
the banking sector. Given the central role played by banks in the credit process and the
economy in general, this process of financial consolidation has attracted substantial
attention not only from managers and shareholders but also from borrowers and policy-
makers (Masseli, 2005). 
One often-held view of mergers is that firms are merging just to get bigger.
Accompanying that notion is a fear that as merging firms grab greater market share,
individual redeems and competition are threatened, because bigger is perceived as greater
concentration of power. But it is far more than only the desire to become bigger. Mergers
enable the banking industry to take advantage of new opportunities created by changes
in the technological and regulatory environment. While mergers have certainly reduced
the number of banks nationwide, concentration of power in local banking markets has
not increased (Hackethal, 2007: 387–424).
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German banks experienced a merger wave throughout the last 20 years. However,
the success of bank mergers remains a continuous matter of debate. The drastic and
continuous decline of the number of competitors since the early 1990s is one of the
lighthouse cases put forward as an illustration of this claim. In fact, the number of banks
constituting the three pillars1 of German banking declined from 4177 to 1920 due to
mergers and acquisitions between 1991 and 2007 (Koetter, Bos, Heid, Kolari, Kool,
Porath, 2007: 1–33). Mergers are categorised as a success that fulfil simultaneously two
criteria. First, merged institutes must exhibit cost efficiency (CE) levels above the average
of non-merging banks. Second, banks must exhibit cost efficiency changes between
merger and evaluation year above efficiency changes of non-merging banks. This
taxonomy is employed to characterise (successful) mergers in terms of various key-
performance and structural indicators and investigate the implications for three important
policy issues. The main conclusions are (Masseli, 2005): 
• approximately every second merger is a success,
• the margin of success is narrow, as the CE differential between merging and non-
merging banks is one percentage point. 
Since the early 1990s the number of banks declined substantially in most financial
systems. Ongoing consolidation is a global phenomenon. However, it has been most
remarkable in the largest banking market in Europe in Germany. According to the most
recent report on EU banking structures by the European Central Bank (ECB) the number
of credit institutions in Germany declined by approximately 45 percent between 1997
and 2007, by far the largest reduction in the EU (Koetter, Bos, Heid, Kolari, Kool, Porath,
2007: 1–33). Yet, Germany still hosts most banks in Europe and exhibits the most
fragmented market in this comparison. This may explain why for example the ECB
expects further bank mergers especially among relatively small savings and cooperative
banks. An evaluation of the success of past merger activity is therefore crucial. A
stochastic cost frontier is estimate to measure the Cost Efficiency (CE) of banks. 
On the basis of a comparison of both efficiency levels and changes of merging versus
non-merging banks it is distinguished successful from non-successful mergers. Only those
banks that exhibit simultaneously higher levels and changes in efficiency after a
transaction are deemed a success. The main result is that approximately every second
merger is a success according to this taxonomy. However, the mean difference between
merging and non-merging banks is slim. On average, CE levels of the former are around
a mere percentage point higher compared to the according cohort of non-merging banks
in a given year. 
This difference remains fairly stable for a range of one to nine years that elapsed after
a deal. This grouping is used to investigate if mergers that are subject to three deal specific
characteristics are more or less often a success or a failure. The first deal specific
characteristic is the size of pre-merger CE differentials between targets and acquirers to
capture the potential for learning benefits due to the transfer of managerial skills.
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efficiency gains. In the long run, the partners succeed more frequently in terms of CE. The
second deal-specific characteristic refers to the usefulness of mergers as a tool to resolve
bank distress. Banks emerging from a deal that involved a distressed target are
approximately as often in the success group as non-distressed mergers. However, those
deals where the acquiring institute is distressed exhibit less frequently CE levels and
changes above the benchmark set by non-merging banks (Beitel, Schiereck, Wahrenburg,
2006: 1–40). 
2. Competitive Pressure
The study of the Deutsche Bundesbank (2007) has on its disposal data on all savings
and cooperative banks for the period from 1993 until 2007. The focus is put on two pillars
for three reasons:
• they account for more than a third of total assets managed in the German banking
system and represent more than 80 percent of all banks in terms of number,
• the vast majority of mergers occurred among these institutes. While a number of
studies focus on mergers among publicly listed banks, this study provides the only
evidence on the (lack of) success of mergers for these banking sectors as a whole,
• Hackethal (2007: 387–424) points out that savings and cooperative banks are vital
to the backbone of Germany’s economy, namely the “Mittelstand”. 
All banks operating in Germany annually report balance sheet and profit and loss
account data. To grasp the dynamics of competitive pressure during the last decade, the
following table hast to be considered. Profitability as measured by Return on Equity
(ROE) more than halved in this period. If competition increases, prices are driven down
to marginal cost. As markets approach perfect competition, textbook economic theory
predicts that no additional rents above marginal cost can be realised. Marginal cost cannot
be observed. But the development of ROE indicates in any case that comfortable profit
bolsters during the early 1990s no longer prevail among German banks. 
The fact that Cost-Income Ratios (CI) stayed fairly constant in the course of events
signals that the deterioration of profitability cannot be explained by poor bank
management alone. In such a case, administrative expenses as a share of operating revenue
should have soared in lock-step. However, with the exception of the period involving
stock market crashes around the turn of the century, we observe that mean CI2 ratios seem
to have been kept in check on an ongoing basis. At the same time, deteriorating net Interest
Margins (NIM) could reflect how spreads between lending and borrowing are competed
away. Seemingly, ongoing consolidation, as illustrated by the declining number of banks,
did not result in banks seeking monopoly rents. Individual cooperative and savings banks
might still be too small to exercise market power. The mean size of banks increased from
around C = 300m to a still fairly small scale of operations of C = 820m. This indicates that
despite increasing mean size banks continued to face considerable competition. 
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bank exited the market due to outright failure during the observation period. The
consolidation nonetheless left a profound imprint on Germany’s banking structure. Local
market concentration increased by more than 25 percent3. Measured by total assets under
management per county and year we record an increase in the Hirschman-Herfindahl
Index from just below 3000 to 4110 points between 1993 and 2003.
In sum, simple Key Performance Indicators (KPI) convey in line with Bikker and
Bos (2005: 9–80) that competitive pressures increased among German banks during the
last decade despite increasing concentration. A massively reduced number of institutes
bear witness to a changing bank market structure. The brunt of these changes is in fact
borne by mergers. The massive reduction of the number of banks demands an evaluation
of the success of mergers and the implications for the industry in a more detailed fashion.
3. Consolidation
The Deutsche Bundesbank collected data on 1417 targets during the period from
1994 to 20024. The table provides data on the mean size of acquiring, target and non-
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power, concentration and prices. We rather restrict ourselves to simply acknowledge that market structure
changed substantially in terms of markedly fewer banks managing increasingly larger volumes of assets.
4 The total number of targets is 1 465 in the reference period, representing a decline from 3 464
institutes in 1993 to 1 999 institutes in 2002. We had to discard 48 mergers due to missing data on either
the acquirer or the target. We lack information prior to 1994 and after 2002.
Ta ble  1.  Key  per for man ce  in di ca tors  of  Ger man  ban king  1993–2003 
1) Ewturn on equity;
2) Cost-income ratio;
3) Net interect margin;
4) Hirschman-Herfindahl Index between 1 and 10,000 per county.
So ur ce:  Deut sche  Bun des bank,  Bank  Stu dies,  Mer gers  and  Re gu la tion,  Frank furt  am  Ma in  2007.
Year RO E1) CI2) NI M3) HHI4) Banks
1993 19.5 70.6 3.2 2,976 3,464
1994 15.7 67.1 3.3 3,080 3,305
1995 18.3 69.6 3.1 3,142 3,203
1996 16.5 70.2 3.1 3,199 3,103
1997 14.5 70.5 3.0 3,263 3,004
1998 12.2 72.6 2.7 3,350 2,833
1999 10.9 73.6 2.7 3,514 2,597
2000 9.3 74.2 2.7 3,656 2,347
2001 7.3 75.8 2.6 3,788 2,147
2002 7.9 72.8 2.7 3,967 1,999
2003 9.3 71.6 2.8 4,110 1,868
To tal 13.6 71.4 2.9 3,389 29,870
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group. Additionally, both the total volume and the number of acquirer and targets are
supplied. 
In accordance with Beitel, Schiereck and Wahrenburg (2007: 1–40), it can be
observed that most mergers occurred among cooperative banks. While the number of
German savings banks declined by approximately 20 percent from 654 banks in 1994 to
519 banks at year end of 2003, the corresponding decline of cooperative banks is 45
percent, reflecting a reduction in the number of banks from 2651 to 1480 in the same
period5. Consequently, the merger process in the two sectors might differ. For example,
regulation and/or government ownership potentially shelters savings banks to a larger
extent from competition compared to cooperatives. It can be expected that market
structure and profitability measures are to exhibit these differences. 
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Ta ble  2. Si  ze and num  ber of mer  gers per sec  tor
1) Me  an to  tal as  sets in mn Eu  ro one year prior to trans  ac  tion;
2) Sum of acqu  ired as  sets in mn Eu  ro;
3) Mul ti ple  acqu irers  on ly  in c lu ded  on ce  per  year;  se rial  acqu irers  in c lu ded  in  each  mer ger  year.
So ur ce:  Deut sche  Bun des bank,  Bank  Stu dies,  Mer gers  and  Re gu la tion,  Frank furt  am  Ma in  2007.
Sa vinks  Banks
Mer ger  year Acqu ire r1) Tar ge ta1) Non -mer gin g1) To tal TA2) N  Acqu ire r3) N Tar get
1994 0,770 295 1,166 13,900 36 47
1995 0,504 317 1,253 9,200 22 29
1996 1,630 384 1,329 6,530 13 17
1997 1,660 764 1,411 6,120 7 8
1998 1,890 683 1,493 2,730 4 4
1999 1,320 576 1,585 8,640 12 15
2000 1,560 863 1,605 12,900 13 15
2001 2,090 743 1,651 17,800 20 24
2002 3,810 567 1,705 9,630 16 17
Me an 1,520 497 1,523 11,400 Sum 143 176
Co ope ra ti ve  banks
1994 180 53 160 5,700 104 108
1995 209 65 173 4,380 65 67
1996 321 68 187 5,290 72 78
1997 382 79 200 6,590 79 84
1998 355 95 211 15,100 141 159
1999 427 134 224 28,000 174 209
2000 394 112 234 26,700 202 238
2001 384 115 239 19,400 147 169
2002 455 155 252 20,000 114 129
Me an 362 106 220 18,000 Sum 1,098 1,241
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If it is assumed that increased competition is indeed a major driving force of mergers
and therefore changing market structures, it is interesting to learn about the immediate
implications for bank’s post-merger profitability and costs. The next table shows the mean
key performance indicators (KPI) which is depicted to compare merging and non-merging
banks across bank sectors in the year a deal occurred6.
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Ta ble  3. Me an  cha rac te ri stics  of  mer ging  ver sus  non -mer ging  banks
1) Net in  te  rest mar  gin in per  cent;
2) Hir sch man -Her fin dahl  In dex  in  po ints;
3) Pro duc ti vi ty  ap pro xi ma ted  as  FTE  per  mn  Eu ro  of  to tal  as sets;
4) Unit cost in cents of to  tal ope  ra  ting cost per Eu  ro of to  tal as  sets;
5) In  co  me struc  tu  re as fee over to  tal re  ve  nue in per  cent;
6)Test for equ  ali  ty of me  ans.
No te:  Exc lu ding  per -mer ger  ob se rva tions  of  ul ti ma te ly  mer ging  banks.
So ur ce:  Deut sche  Bun des bank,  Bank  Stu dies,  Mer gers  and  Re gu la tion,  Frank furt  am  Ma in  2007.
KPI
Sa vings  banks Co ope ra ti ve  banks
Non Mer ger p -va lu e6) Non Mer ger p -va lu e6)
ROE 15.6 8.4 0.000 13.7 8.7 0.000
CI 65.6 70.4 0.000 71.8 75.9 0.108
NI M1) 2.7 2.8 0.213 2.9 2.8 0.000
HHI2) 3,685 5,305 0.000 3,239 3,589 0.000
Pro d3) 0.29 0.33 0.000 0.33 0.34 0.000
UC4) 5.8 5.7 0.755 6.0 6.1 0.001
IN C5) 7.7 7.7 0.941 8.8 10.4 0.000
N 4,294 143 8,508 1,098
Profitability differed significantly for both banking groups between merging and non-
merging banks by 5 to 7 percentage points of ROE. Likewise, cost pressure is higher for
banks that just merged, as measured by higher CI ratios. However, comparably poor KPI
(Key Performance Indicator) may result from a recent transaction, for example, due to the
integration of a new sales force or from incurring additional advisor fees during the
transaction. Local concentration, measured by HHI (Hirschman-Herfindahl Index), is
higher among those banks that merged, especially for savings banks. Those banks that
merged are thus operating in local markets with at times markedly fewer competitors.
This can imply market power. But at the same time mean NIM (Net Interest Margin) do
not differ a lot between merging and non-merging banks. Furthermore, for savings banks
mean NIM is not significantly different despite substantially higher concentration among
merging savings banks. Rent seeking therefore seems to be an issue of less importance in
our sample. But while only limited evidence for rent seeking is found, higher
concentration may still imply that market discipline is lacking and therefore banks fail to
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surplus and are thus undesirable. This line of thought is supported by higher CI ratios for
merging banks of both sectors, when paired with higher mean concentration7.
In line with Koetter (2007), the described characteristics indicate that merging banks
perform at best mediocre. But with regard to the evaluation of the success of mergers, it
can be argued that all of the discussed measures suffer from two major limitations. The
first caveat refers to the development of KPI over time. For example, lower labour
productivity in the transaction year itself may merely reflect the rigidity of German labour
laws. Adjustments of the labour force are time-consuming as, for example, numerous
employees at savings banks are protected by civil servant status. Hence, large scale labour
force reduction is only possible by using natural fluctuation rather than Anglo-Saxon style
lay-off waves. Therefore, it is crucial to track the performance of merged institutes over
some time. The second caveat is that any of the measures provide little information about
what the optimal KPI could have been for banks operating under potentially markedly
different circumstances. After all, the share of the difference between mean ROE for
merging and non-merging banks that is attributable to poor management of the bank
versus deteriorating economic conditions or sheer bad luck remains unclear. 
It simply cannot be stated by observing some increased post merger ROE whether the
firm performed optimally – a higher return after the merger might still be far from what
could have been attained. An alternative strand in the literature therefore suggests
benchmarking banks according to their ability to convert inputs into outputs8. Cost
efficiency (CE) is employed to measure the success of mergers. This approach ranks firms
relative to an optimal industry cost function. The appeal of this measure is to evaluate
mergers on the basis of simple textbook microeconomic theory. It is to be assumed that
banks operate on markets that are appropriately described by perfect competition9. Cost
minimising firm is expected to produce its outputs by demanding required inputs subject
to prevailing input prices. Estimating an optimal cost function under the assumption that
deviations from best practice are, first, due to random noise and, second, due to inefficient
allocation of inputs. Intuitively, no bank can incur systematically higher costs compared
to competitors. To avoid being driven out of the market any bank has to demand inputs
in optimal proportions to produce a given output vector. This also holds for banks which
potentially pursue alternative objectives – in the long run no firm can afford systematically
higher costs for identical production factors employed10. 
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7 Note that the high p-value for the difference in mean test for cooperative banks may be due to
outliers in the data. As we intend in this section to describe the stylized facts we included all banks which
submitted data to the Bundesbank and were thus in operation. When estimating the efficient cost frontier
we conducted robustness checks by excluding extreme observations. Results remained qualitatively
unaffected 
8 See for example: Vannder Vennet (1996, 2003), DeYoung (1997) and Peristiani (1997).
9 For the validity of this assumption see also: Bikker and Bos.
10 In contrast, it may very well be possible that German savings and cooperative banks may not
strictly maximise their revenues as to maximise profits. Therefore, ROE and other traditional performance
measures may fall short to assess the success of bank mergers. But even with these philanthropic co-
objectives it is plausible that while revenues may not be maximised any bank has to optimise its costs
when allocating resources to provide financial services.
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It must be distinguished between successful and unsuccessful mergers. Of special
interest is the development of bank-specific characteristics as measured by the previously
introduced KPI over time. As opposed to these bank-specific characteristics, merger
success might crucially depend on characteristics related to both how the deal is conducted
and the environment in which it takes place. It is referred to these as deal-specific
characteristics11:
1. Transfer of skills between merging banks.
2. Mergers as distress resolution tool.
3. Influence of regional demarcation.
With the exception of the influence of regional demarcation on merger success, these
deal characteristics are regarded as endogenous to merger management. Regulation cannot
be influenced by the management in charge of conducting the merger. Rather,
investigation of the relation between regional demarcation and merger success intends to
shed light on the costs and benefits of this arrangement. 
6. Transfer of Skills
Lang and Welzel (2007: 63–84) investigate merger effects for a sample restricted to
cooperative banks in the state of Bavaria. They find that in 53% of all mergers the acquirer
is more cost efficient than the target. However, only 18% of all merged banks with higher
ex ante acquirer CE managed to exhibit above average efficiency growth after the merger.
In contrast, they find that 35% of all mergers with positive ex ante CE differences yield
below average CE growth after the merger. They conclude that these acquirers failed to
transfer their superior CE skills to the target. This finding reflects that the transfer of cost
management skills matters a lot to determine success but that it can be difficult to
accomplish. If banks with superior CE performance manage to lift the merged units’
overall CE, mergers are a desirable because they improve the competitive position of a
bank and thereby strengthen the stability of the whole banking system12.
Whether a beneficial transfer of skill is successful depends on two major factors.
First, the size of the ex ante differential. On the one hand, a larger differential can indicate
that cost management skills of one of the partners are clearly below those of the other
partner. Then, potential for improvement is easily identified. Relatively large gains may
be quickly realised by simple imitation. An example is that one bank pursues excessive
spending on real estate resulting in excessive office capacities. Switching to facilities
closer to market cost then entails a quick win if switching costs are low enough. On the
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11 Clearly, there is a virtually infinite number of additional factors that may matter, for example
board compositions or local macroeconomic environments. Our choice here is motivated by the
availability of data and the policy relevance of the deal characteristic from our point of view.
12 How far such joint CE must be lifted depends on the definition of a successful merger. We discuss
that matter at length in the next subsection.
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problems that cannot be easily remedied. An example is a funding structure incurring too
high interest payments. If these are stipulated in contracts there is presumably little a new
management team can do in the short run. 
The second factor refers to whether it is the target or the acquirer that exhibits higher
CE. Acquirers that are dominant in terms of CE may very well command sufficient power
to enforce their management procedures on the target. 
Consequently, majority stakes cannot be accumulated in a hostile fashion. The
absence of a full-fledged market for corporate control may imply that objectives other
than value maximisation are important for determining the acquirer and target in a merger.
If it is indeed to some extent a political process that determines the role in a merger, it may
turn out that a large but potentially less efficient bank is the acquirer. Then, it can be less
likely that best practise from the target is wholeheartedly embraced by the new
organisation. Whether such scenarios prevail and whether we can observe particular
combinations of pre-merger CE differentials to yield systematically more (or less)
successful mergers remains an empirical question that we address below. This way,
bankers, head organisations and regulators can evaluate pending mergers on the basis of
pre-merger CE differentials to promote beneficial combinations that are likely to improve
CE.
7. Mergers and Distress
As no single bank went into outright bankruptcy it is reasonable to expect that a
number of bank mergers served the purpose to remedy distress. The next table underpins
that around 100 mergers are identified as distressed transactions. The literature from
Porath (2004: 1–32) and Koetter et al. (2007: 1–33) are retrieve data on distressed banks
from the Bundesbank’s database on default information. The only focus here is put on
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Ta ble  4. Di stres sed  mer ger  part ners
No te:  Sa vings  and  co ope ra ti ve  banks.
So ur ce:  Deut sche  Bun des bank,  Bank  Stu dies,  Mer gers  and  Re gu la tion,  Frank furt  am  Ma in  2007.
Year No ne Tar get Acqu irer Both To tal
1994 155 n.a. n.a. n.a. 155
1995 91 1 4 0 96
1996 90 2 3 0 95
1997 85 2 3 2 92
1998 141 12 10 0 163
1999 199 14 9 2 224
2000 233 12 7 1 193
2001 176 4 12 1 193
2002 146 n.a. n.a. n.a. 146
To tal 1,316 47 48 6 1,417
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the following table, distressed mergers are not limited to cases where a bank becomes a
target. 
In fact, it occurred equally often that distress resulted in the bank acquiring a non-
distressed bank. Only in six cases, both parties involved in the merger were classified as
distressed by Bundesbank records. 
8. Mergers and regional proximity
The process of merging involves additional important institutions next to the
Bundesbank and the Federal Institute for Financial Services Supervision (“Bundesanstalt
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin”). These are the respective head organisations of
the savings and cooperative bank sectors, DSGV and BVR, respectively. While
supervision authorities adhere to principles of financial soundness and stability,
representatives of these head organisations guard what is known as the principle of
regional demarcation (“Regionalprinzip”)14. This principle is de facto enforced among
both cooperative and savings banks. It stipulates that regional banks of these sectors must
not conduct operations beyond the borders of their assigned region. The objective of this
regulation is to ensure that rural and economically weak areas are also supplied with
financial services in Germany. Consequently, many mergers among savings and
cooperatives involve banks which are geographically close to each other. The following
table depicts the number of mergers where both target and acquirer originate from the
same region. In 64 percent of the events, mergers among savings banks involve targets and
acquirers that originated from the same county (“Kreis”)15. Approximately 15 percent of
all mergers in this group concern banks from the same municipality (“Gemeinde”)16.
For cooperative banks regional proximity of merger partners is even more evident. In
almost 80 percent of all the cases, both parties are from the same county. A quarter of all
cooperative bank mergers involve banks from the same municipality. There are two main
reasons why mergers in the same region can be superior. First, it is possible that these
transactions serve the purpose of reaching some required minimum size to operate
efficiently. If two banks serve the same community with considerable overlap in their
customer base, joined operations can help reduce unit costs if excess capacities, for
example branches or employees, are reduced. 
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13 Detailed definitions of distress can be found in Porath (2004) and Koetter et al. (2005).
14 Legal definitions of financial soundness and stability, to which both Bundesbank and BaFin
adhere, are outlined in a series of laws. The German Banking Act (“Kreditwesengesetz, KWG”) is the
most important one and is complemented by a number of regulations.
15 Equal to the sum of county and municipality mergers over total, i.e. (86+26):176, as one county
is distinguished into multiple municipalities.
16 Ideally, we investigate the geographical distance between target(s) and acquirer given the
prevailing regional demarcation issued by the head organisations. Alas, this information is not available
and we have to resort to publicly available regional indicators of counties and municipalities where banks
are located. The number of counties with banks is 438 and the according number of municipalities is
2333.
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acquirer is presumably familiar with local market conditions, for example weaknesses
and strengths of local corporate firms, local politics or customer habits. 
On the other hand, it is possible that the Regionalprinzip implies a lack of potential
partners in a given region. Then it is more likely that target and acquirer may fail to
complement each other, e.g. in terms of product range or funding structure. Mergers of
banks located fairly close to each other might merely reflect restrictions imposed by
regulation. Another reason why close regional proximity can result in inferior post merger
performance is a lack of regional (income) diversification. The merged institute’s revenue
basis will be further concentrated within confined boundaries, thus exposing the bank to
a larger degree to local macroeconomic conditions17.
9. Successful Mergers
Identification of successful mergers on the basis of the level of efficiency alone might
be misleading. Consider as an example a bank that merged in 1995. Assume it exhibits
CE of 80 percent in 1997 relative to an average CE of non-merging banks of 75 percent.
On this basis alone the merger may then be considered a success. But if the bank exhibited
cost efficiency of 85 percent in the year of the merger, 1995, the decline by 5 percent is
hardly an achievement. Therefore mergers are compared along two dimensions.
The first dimension is the acquirer’s change in CE in year t relative to the year of the
merger. The second is the level of CE of the merged institute in year t after the merger.
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17 Note an important caveat. Regions assigned to banks are not publicly available. Therefore, we have
to resort here to available regional identifiers, namely counties and municipalities. Hence, our approach
to investigate the relation between regional proximity and successful mergers should be understand as a
crude approximation of the implications of the principle of regional demarcation only.
Ta ble  5. Re gio nal  ori gin  of  mer ging  banks
So ur ce:  Deut sche  Bun des bank,  Bank  Stu dies,  Mer gers  and  Re gu la tion,  Frank furt  am  Ma in  2007.
Re gion Co un ty Mi ni ci pa li ty To tal
Year Sa vings Co op’s Sa vings Co op’s Sa vings Co op’s
1994 28 60 3 29 47 108
1995 15 34 7 19 29 67
1996 6 35 4 30 17 78
1997 4 44 2 25 8 84
1998 1 91 1 41 4 159
1999 5 129 1 36 15 209
2000 6 136 4 50 15 238
2001 13 88 3 36 24 169
2002 8 77 1 22 17 129
To tal 86 694 26 288 176 1,241
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18 We have information about merger activities between 1994 and 2002. Hence, the maximum
number of post-merger years available is nine years, namely from 1995 to 2003.
19 We refer henceforth to those banks that never merged as non-merging banks. Thereby, we avoid
comparing in a given year merging bank’s performance to a benchmark that includes some banks which
may merge later on. In fact, a banks’ CE one year prior to merger may already differ markedly from CE
of banks never merging and can thus constitute a poor benchmark sample. By excluding bank-year
observations of institutes that eventually merge we avoid furthermore a potential upward bias in the
benchmark if successful banks merge early. Including these successful early movers in the merger wave
would then constitute a too high benchmark for those relatively poor performing banks that follow suit
at later stages of the merger wave.
20 Note that our formulation of a benchmark is quite conservative as it requires successful mergers
to outperform non-merging banks simultaneously along two dimensions. Alternative and less rigorous
benchmarks are conceivable. For example, Vander Vennet (2003) compares on the one hand pre- and 
The first dimension captures changes in CE. As many practitioners point out, potential
gains require some time until they materialise. Therefore, efficiency reports changes for
a range of time t from 1 until 918. To evaluate whether a particular merger was successful,
a benchmark is used as the average efficiency change of those banks that never merged,
i.e. mean CE of all banks like D in figure 1 in year t19. Hence, a decline in efficiency need
not necessarily imply a bad merger. If a bank suffered, for example, from a five percent
drop in CE but the group of non-merging banks experienced a drop of ten percent, the
merger helped to offset the negative trend. For example, when comparing the two-year CE
change of a bank that merged in 1995 in 1997 with the CE change of non-merging banks
in the same two years. 
The second dimension is the level of CE of merging and non-merging banks. For
example, along this second dimension, we compare a bank that merged in 1995 two years
after the merger relative to the level of mean CE of non-merging banks in 199720. Consider
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success. These transactions yield, first, higher CE levels compared to non-merging banks
in the year examined and, second, enjoyed an increase in CE since the merger above the
mean CE change of non-merging banks during the same time period. Below, if these
successful mergers are examined also exhibit other favourable KPI, e.g. higher
profitability and lower CI ratios. Likewise, we examine if successful (as well as
unsuccessful) mergers exhibit a clear profile in terms of deal-specific characteristics in
terms of transferring skills, regional proximity of partners, distress and learning effects.
The south-eastern quadrant, group II, is deemed unsuccessful. Merged banks exhibit
above non-merging average CE two years after the transaction. But the change in CE is
lower compared to the mean change of non-merging banks. Such mergers are unsuccessful
because, for the example of an increasing industry trend in CE, the bank failed to match
positive market developments. This could be the case if the acquiring bank was already
highly cost efficient prior to the merger leading to high levels of CE in the merger year
itself21. A high level of CE could have led to a too relaxed attitude towards rolling out
superior cost management skills at the target quickly. It is expected to obtain an indication
if banks with extreme pre-merger differentials fall relatively more often into this (or other)
merger groups, reflecting either inability or sheer neglect of transferring knowledge.
The south-western quadrant, group III, depicts the worst mergers. In the above
example, mergers conducted in 1995 resulted two years later in CE levels below those of
non-merging banks in 1997, i.e. 74,94%. Moreover, these banks exhibit a change in CE
below the average of non-merging banks, namely 0.04 percent. It is seen that these banks
do also perform poorly in terms of traditional KPI as they exhibit in terms of CE neither
high levels of cost management skill nor above average improvements. Finally, the north-
western quadrant, group IV, depicts banks with below non-merging banks’ mean CE but
with above average changes in CE. Consequently, these transactions are not univocally a
success. But they may have the largest potential as promising changes in CE may indicate
above average efficiency after some more time. It is interesting below if, for example,
especially those mergers are a success where one partner suffered from clear deficiencies
as reflected by distress. While turning around a distressed bank could imply below average
levels of CE for a while, focused restructuring efforts could show up in our taxonomy as
above average improvements of CE. Before turning to an assessment of the German
merger wave on the basis of our results let briefly point out a potential caveat. The two
dimensions on which our grouping is based, namely the level and change of CE,
respectively, are not entirely independent from each other. A bank that exhibits above
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post-merger efficiency rankings within the group of merging banks and on the other he compares these
measures between merging banks and those of a peer group selected on the basis of  institutional form,
country and size. Here, we prefer to explicitly allow the merger event to enter the fixed effect of the
frontier and thereby influence the relative benchmark more directly. Regarding the alternative of a peer
group comparison we acknowledge here that our sample already is much more homogenous compared
to a cross-country study. Given the large number of mergers we argue that the choice of relevant peer
groups would be hard to achieve and is likely to result in arbitrary selection criteria.
21 Note, however, that we do not consider here how efficient the bank was in the year of the merger
but compare it to the benchmark t years after the merger.
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with a level of CE above the average CE of non-merging banks. However, we argue that
most alternative approaches that rely either on level of CE or, for that matter, other KPI
do suffer from even more severe problems as these approaches neglect the development
of the chosen performance ratio entirely.
Conclusion
Taxonomy is suggested as how to evaluate the merger wave of German savings and
cooperative banks. Cost efficiency (CE) estimates are employed to obtain with stochastic
frontier analysis to benchmark banks on the basis of their ability to efficiently convert
inputs into outputs.
Successful mergers are defined as those which, first, yield CE levels that are above
mean CE of non-merging banks and, second, exhibit larger changes between the
evaluation and merger years as compared to the respective cohort of non-merging banks
in the same period.
These results indicate that approximately every second merger is a success according
to the taxonomy. On average, cooperative bank mergers are more often a success than
savings bank mergers. Importantly, the margin of success as indicated by mean CE level
differences between merging and non-merging banks is very small – on the order of one
to two percentage points only. Successful mergers exhibit higher profitability than
transactions resulting in below benchmark changes of CE, i.e. groups II and III. However,
it can be found for both banking groups that mergers in group IV, i.e. those that exhibit
the highest change in CE but below benchmark CE levels, also exhibit high profitability.
For savings banks, both concentration and net interest margins are highest for group IV,
too. These findings can be interpreted as indication that savings bank transactions might
fail to yield CE improvements due to the absence of market discipline. In contrast, it can
be found that for cooperative banks that mean concentration and net interest margins
remain similar across groups. Consequently, market power concerns do not seem to be an
issue for cooperative bank mergers. Investigation of three particularities of the German
bank merger wave lead to the following core conclusions. 
First, the potential for transferring skills from acquirers and targets is low as mean pre-
merger CE differentials are minuscule. Those few transactions with high CE differentials
do not result in sustained CE gains. Instead, it is found that successful mergers exhibit no
mean CE differentials. 
Second, bank mergers where the acquirer is distressed are less often a success. In
contrast, mergers involving distressed targets lead in the short and medium run relatively
more often to successful mergers. Therefore, mergers where the less efficient institute is
the target are preferable.
Third, regional proximity of merger partners has on balance detrimental CE effects
for savings banks but positive CE effects for cooperative banks. Mergers of cooperative
banks from the same municipality are in the medium and long run more often successful.
In contrast, savings bank mergers involving partners from the same municipality are rarely
a success and more often an outright failure. 
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the basis of relative profit efficiency (PE). Because only few banks manage to be efficient
in both dimensions, we hypothesise that a simultaneous classification based on PE and CE
yields even fewer successful bank mergers
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Streszczenie
W ar ty ku le  zo sta ła  przed sta wio na  z ostat nich  dwu dzie stu  lat  sy tu acja  na  ryn ku  fu zji
i prze jęć  w sek to rze  ban ko wym.  Istot ną  część  ar ty ku łu  sta no wi  iden ty fi ka cja  głów nych
kry te riów  po wo dze nia  fu zji.  Są  one  wy ja śnio ne  na  przy kła dzie  ba dań  Deut sche  Bun des -
bank  i Eu ro pe an  Cen tral  Bank.  W ar ty ku le  znaj dzie my  rów nież  od po wiedź  na  py ta ni,
w ja kim  za kre sie  więk sza  ry wa li za cja  ryn ko wa  ma  wpływ  na  wzmo żo ną  ak tyw ność  ban -
ków  w ob sza rze  fu zji  i prze jęć.
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